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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Inherent Power of the Court-Constitutional Grant of PowerContempt. In State v. Estill' the Washington Supreme Court held that
it would not be bound by the terms of the contempt statutes. C. J.
Brooks, the father of Ermie Estill, and Robert Reditt, her fiancee, gave
false testimony as defense witnesses in her jury trial. Brooks and
Reditt were cited for contempt of court "on the basis of the clearly
2 and were adjudged
apparentand partly conceded perjury of each.. ."
guilty in that "said conduct tended to impair the authority of the court
and to interrupt the course of the trial ... ." The two defense witnesses consolidated their appeals and obtained a reversal from the
court, sitting departmentally. On petition for rehearing the court
agreed with the conclusion of the departmental opinion, but disagreed
with the reasons set forth.
The departmental opinion set out the statutory definition of contempts of cour and held that this perjury did not fall within its terms,
saying:
As to the existence of common-law contempts in this state, we have
set out the statutory definition in its entirety because its comprehensive
nature indicates that the legislature intended to cover the entire field of
contempts. The legislature has the power of superseding the common
law. It has elected to do so in this instance. We, therefore, limit ourselves to an interpretation of the statute.5
The court, en banc, firmly rejected this holding, stating:
A majority of the court does not agree that the legislature has the
power to supersede the inherent power of a constitutional court to
punish for contempt; nor does a majority of the court believe that the
legislature has attempted to do so.6
This statement, as well as the excerpts quoted by the court from
various authorities, is ambiguous because of its brevity. The court
does not make it clear whether the legislature may affect the court's
contempt powers at all, and indeed loosely implies that it may not.
Generally, the courts of other jurisdictions allow regulatory legislation,
but not limitary legislation.'
155 Wn.2d 576, 349 P2d 210 (1960), affirming on other groun& 50 Wn.2d 331, 311
P2d 667 (1957).
2State v. Estill, 50 Wn.2d 331, 332, 311 P.2d 667, 688 (1957).
3Id. at 332, 311 P.2d at 668.
4RCW 7.20.010.
5 State v. Estill, 50 Wn2d 331, 334-35, 311 P.2d 667, 669-70 (1957).
6 State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 579, 349 P.2d 210, 212 (1960).
7See Annot., 121 A.L.R. 215 (1939); THomAs, PwOBysaS OF CoNTEMPT OF COURT

50 (1934).
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The court cited Corpus Juris Secundums for the proposition that the
legislature may not destroy, or abridge, or limit, as by definition, the
inherent power of courts to punish for contempt.' However, that reference further states that "although there is authority to the contrary,
the legislature may, however, regulate the use of the power, and in
some jurisdictions.., the punishment that may be imposed.""0
Similarly, American Jurisprudence" was cited by the court but it
must be noted that American Jurisprudencequalifies its remarks with
the assertion that: "It [a constitutionally created court] may, however, regulate the practice in proceedings for contempt, . . . limit or

extend the powers of punishment . . .""
Washington has recognized the power of the legislature to regulate
procedural matters, provided that it does not deprive the court of
powers essential to the proper exercise of its judicial functions. 4 Also,
acting in the interest of self-preservation, the court has held that its
dignity and the necessity for orderly procedure require that the legislature not be allowed to provide for the intervention of a jury in a
contempt proceeding. 5 In addition, it has been indicated that the legislature is limited in its power to prescribe the punishment which may
be inflicted for contemptuous conduct. 6 While early cases" have
stated that the legislature may declare what acts or omissions shall
constitute contempt, State v. Estill follows the majority rule 8 in pointing out that the legislature may not exhaustively do so.
The philosophy which seems to have governed the Washington court
has been carefully stated in a student casenote:
This power [to punish for contempt], therefore, is an inherent one
8 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 43(b)

(1939).
9 55 Wn.2d 576, 579, 349 P.2d 210, 212 (1960).
10 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 43(b) at 59 (1939).
11 12 AM. JuR. Contempt § 49 (1938).
12 55 Wn.2d 576, 579, 349 P.2d 210, 212 (1960).
"s 12 Am. JUR. Contempt § 49, at 424 (1938).
14 In the well known case, State ex. rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior
Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770 (1928), the court asserted its power to prescribe
rules of procedure, but avoided a decision as to whether the power was granted by the
legislature or was inherent. However, eight years later, in Blanchard v. Golden Age
Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 418, 63 P.2d 397, 407 (1936), it was held: "Undoubtedly,
the legislature may prescribe reasonable regulations governing court procedure. ...
But the courts are not required to recognize a legislative restriction which has the
effect of depriving them of a constitutional grant or of one of their inherent powers."
15 Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 423-24, 63 P.2d 397, 409
(1936); State ex. rel. Dailey v. Dailey, 164 Wash. 140, 144-45, 2 P.2d 79, 81 (1931).
16 See State v. Buddress, 63 Wash. 26, 29, 114 Pac. 879, 881 (1911) (dictum).
1 State v. Buddress, supra note 16, at 29, 114 Pac. at 881 (dictum) ; In re Coulter,
25 Wash. 526, 529, 65 Pac. 759, 760 (1901) (dictum) ; State v. Tugwill, 19 Wash. 238,
252-53, 52 Pac. 1056, 1061 (1898) (dictum).
Is See TH OMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 51 (1934).
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because it, like the power to compel the attendance of witnesses or the
power to call a grand jury and instruct it, is essential to the function9
ing of the court ...
It follows therefore, that while the jurisdiction
of a legislative court may be varied by legislative action, if a court is
one of record, whether of constitutional or statutory origin, the legislature cannot destroy its inherent power to punish contempt.
On the other hand, despite occasional, loose language to the contrary,
this power is not an absolute one ....
[T]he authority of the legislature to regulate this inherent power itself within certain reasonable
limits is recognized even among the strictest inherent power advocates.
. . . [W]hether or not a statutory regulation is valid should depend
upon whether it preserves to the court sufficient power to protect itself
from indignities and to enable it effectively to administer its judicial
functions. 2o
.

Of course, serious problems may arise in distinguishing between legislation so limitary as to be invalid and that which is merely regulatory.
Abstract rules2 ' can furnish only a rough guide, and perhaps the better
approach is to survey the cases of other jurisdictions in a search for
pursuasive holdings as well as in an attempt to understand the underlying factors and attitudes which have motivated the courts.
Judge Mallery, in an opinion concurring in result only, stated that
the Washington contempt statute was in force before the constitution
was adopted, and that while our constitutional forefathers were aware
of it they put no provisions in the constitution repugnant to it.22 He
concluded, therefore, that the statute was "constitutionally validated"
and should not be declared a nullity."
Judge Foster, in a concurring opinion,24 disagreed with Judge Mallery in that he felt that the statute was repugnant to the constitution,
at least in so far as it diminished the jurisdiction of the court. This
viewpoint is more consistent with the controlling philosophy of past
cases. For instance, in Blanchard v.. Golden Age Brewing Co.,25 the
court adopted the federal viewpoint which is that "the courts of the
United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction
19 Note, 21 IowA L. Rxv. 595, 596-97 (1936).
20
21

Id. at 598.

Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 424, 63 P2d 397, 409

(1936), (legislation limitary if court is deprived of powers essential to its efficient

action and the proper administration of justice) ; State ex. reL. Dailey v. Dailey, 164
Wash. 140, 145, 2 P.2d 79, 81 (1931), (power inherent if necessary to preserve the
-dignity of the court and its orderly procedure) ; State cx. rel. Dysart v. Cameron, 140
Wash. 101, 109, 248 Pac. 408, 411 (1926), (legislation limitary if court is deprived of
powers essential to its very existence as a court).

State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 582, 349 P.2d 210, 213 (1960).
Id. at 645, 349 P.2d at 213-14.
4 Id. at 647, 349 P.2d at 214-15.

22
23
2

25

188 Wash. 396, 63 P2d 397 (1936).
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over any subject, at once become possessed of the power [to punish for
contempt].""

The court made it clear that this power was given

because of necessity."
In State v. Estill the majority apparently felt that the power to punish perjury as a contempt was essential to the effective operation of the
court. If this is true,28 then in creating the court our constitutional
forefathers must have granted this power.29 A statute denying
it,
0
passed before or after the constitution, would be repugnant to it.
However, contrary to Judge Mallery's contention, RCW 7.20.010 is
not rendered a nullity because of the Estill decision. It still remains
in force in enumeration of particular acts which may not be within the
court's inherent power to punish, or which the court might not wish to
punish on its own accord."'
The Washington practitioner should not be misled by the rather
loose language appearing in this decision which in places indicates a
radical departure from established law. The court has merely denied
the power of the legislature to deprive it of inherent powers necessary
to its effective operation. It is suggested that the acts enumerated by
statute remain as a substantial part of the Washington law of contempt.32
CHAIRLES F. ABBOTT JR.
JURISDICTION
State Jurisdiction over Indian Country. Two recent Washington
cases, State ex rel. Starlund v. Superior Court' and State ex rel. Adams
26 Michaelson v. United States exr. rel. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42,
65-66 (1924).
27 Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 425, 63 P.2d 397, 409
(1936).
28 Only the court can make this decision. See State v. Frew, 24 WVa. 416, 49 Am.
Rep. 257, 274 (1884).
29 The majority quoted from Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash.
396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936). "But the courts are not required to recognize a legislative
restriction which has the effect of depriving them of a constitutional grant or of one
of their inherent powers. What the legislature has not given, it cannot take away ......
State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 580, 349 P.2d 210, 212 (1960).
20 Hence Judge Mallery's citation of art. XXVII, § 2, of the state constitution,
which provides that "All laws now in force in the Territory of Washington, which are
not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force . . ." (Emphasis added.) does
not contradict, but supports, the majority's decision.
31 See 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 43(b) (1939).
22 Apparently Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn.2d 84, 86, 323 P.2d 231, 232 (1958)
is a still
valid statement of the Washington position. "In general, contempt proceedings in
this jurisdiction may be placed in three categories: (a) criminal contempt prosecuted
under RCW 9.23.010; (b) civil contempt initiated under RCW 7.20.010 et seq; and
(c) contempt proceedings resulting from the long exercised power of constitutional
courts (1) to punish summarily contemptuous conduct occurring in the presence of
the court, (2) to enforce orders or judgments in aid of the court's jurisdiction, and
(3) to punish violations of orders or judgments."
1 157 Wash. Dec. 87, 356 P.2d 994 (1960).

